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Abstract
Blind quantum computation is a scheme that adds unconditional security to cloud quantum
computation. In the protocol proposed by Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi, the ability to
prepare and transmit a single qubit is required for a user (client) who uses a quantum computer
remotely. In case a weak coherent pulse is used as a pseudo single photon source, however, we
must introduce decoy states, owing to the inherent risk of transmitting multiple photon. In this
study, we demonstrate that by using a heralded single photon source and a probabilistic photon
number resolving detector, we can gain a higher blind state generation efficiency and longer access
distance, owing to noise reduction on account of the heralding signal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Universal quantum computing has been developed rapidly in recent years. Indeed, it is
thought that it is only a matter of time until it can be used practically. However, it is
expected that powerful quantum computers will be very large and expensive. There are still
a number of challenges that remain to develop such computers for personal or commercial
use. Therefore, it is indispensable to develop techniques for individual users (clients) to use
quantum computers securely when they are owned by large companies or institutions. Blind
quantum computation is a method of using quantum computers remotely without leaking
information to third parties, including its owner.
Various approaches exist for universal blind quantum computation. Among them, the
BKF protocol—named after Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi [1]—is regarded as practi-
cal because it does not require quantum memory nor quantum operations on the client side.
In accordance with their protocol, we consider measurement-based quantum computing [2],
which is a method of performing quantum computations with many qubit entanglements
measured on the server side. In the BKF protocol, the server performs quantum compu-
tations by creating and measuring multipartite entanglements using qubits transmitted by
the client. By giving randomness to the quantum state to be transmitted, the client can
perform calculations with both the content and results of the calculations concealed on the
server side.
Ideally, the BKF protocol guarantees unconditional security. However, in order to achieve
this, the client must transmit a single photon for each qubit. Although photons are generally
used for signal transmission, it is extremely difficult to prepare an ideal single photon source.
Weak laser light (weak coherent pulse, WCP) is thus used as a pseudo single photon source
in practice. However, with WCP, the number of photons follows Poissonian statistics, so
the probability of transmitting multiple photons can never be zero. As such, information
risks being stolen by the server exist. Given the existence of such imperfections, a protocol
to prepare qubits (remote blind state preparation, RBSP) securely at remote locations is
proposed by Dunjko et al. [3]. With this protocol, it is possible to create a single secure
qubit from multiple signals. In addition, ”ε - blindness” guarantees that the probability
information leaked to the server is less than ε despite following the protocol correctly.
In the RBSP protocol, the client must send many pulses to prepare a single qubit. In
order to estimate the number of pulses accurately and prove the security with fewer pulses,
the decoy state method [4–6] used in the quantum key distribution (QKD) was brought
into RBSP [7, 8]. The decoy state method more precisely estimates the transmittance for
each photon number by sending “decoy” states of different intensities. By adopting this
method in RBSP, it is possible to estimate the lower limit of the number of pulses N that
the client needs to send. In particular, in the original RBSP protocol [3], N = O(1/T 4) for
the transmittance T . N increases considerably with the communication distance. With the
decoy state method and an improved estimation method, by contrast, N = O(1/T ), which
offers a significant improvement.
In QKD, a heralded single photon source (HSPS) has been shown to have an advantage
over WCP regarding the communication distance [9, 10]. A single photon is thus heralded
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by the detection of the counterpart of two photons generated by spontaneous parametric
down-conversion (SPDC). As a result, it is possible to reduce the dark count and extend
the communication distance. In addition, the multi-photon probability can be decreased by
measuring the photon number for the heralding signal, increasing the secure key generation
rate.
In this study, we analyze the required number of pulses N when using HSPS rather than
WCP in universal blind quantum computation (UBQC) and compare the results to the case
of WCP. In Sec. II, we briefly review UBQC based on WCP. In Sec. III, we introduce HSPS
in UBQC in an asymptotic case, and Sec. IV describes RBSP by using a HSPS. Sec. V
compares the two cases followed by discussion in Sec. VI.
II. UNIVERSAL BLIND QUANTUM COMPUTATION WITH WEAK COHER-
ENT PULSES
With the BKF protocol, all information except for the calculated size is completely con-
cealed. However, since there are necessarily imperfections in the real world, complete con-
cealment is difficult. Specifically, it is difficult to prepare an ideal single-photon source, and
WCP utilization is generally assumed. However, insofar as the number of photons follows a
Poisson distribution, pulses containing multiple photons can exist. If there are multi-photon
signals, information leaks to the server (Bob). The RBSP protocol [3] has been proposed to
increase security despite multi-photon signals. Further, “ε - blindness ” serves as an index
for the degree of security.
A. Interlaced 1-D Cluster computation
In the RBSP protocol, interlaced 1-D Cluster computation (I1DC) is used to create a
single qubit from several pulses to increase security even in the case that a multi-photon
pulse is included in the signal pulse sequence [3]. The client (Alice) sends several random-
phased states to Bob. Bob then generates a single qubit using them. The phase of the
generated qubit is the sum (or difference) of all the phases of the states used to create this
qubit. Therefore, Bob cannot obtain information about the phase if any one of the states
sent from Alice is unknown. That is, in the case of sending multiple pulses, no information
leaks to Bob if there is at least one pulse in which just a single photon exists. The procedure
is as follows.
1. Input
Alice randomly assigns σl = 0,
pi
4
, 2pi
4
, ..., 7pi
4
. Send states |+σl〉 = 1√2(|0〉+ eiσl |1〉) (l =
1, ..., k) to Bob.
2. Operation with Bob
(a) Apply CZ(H ⊗ I) to i and the i+ 1-th qubit.
(b) Measure the i-th qubit with Pauli X and output the measured value as si.
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(c) Repeat (a) and (b) from i = 1 to k − 1.
(d) Bob receives an unmeasured qubit of state |+θ〉 and tells Alice s = (s1, s2, ..., sk).
3. Output Alice calculates θ from s = (s1, s2, ..., sk) and σl.
θ =
k∑
l=1
(−1)tlσl (1)
ti =
{∑k−1
j=1 si mod 2 (i > k)
0 (i = k)
(2)
In order for Bob to receive θ, it is necessary to know all σl. That is, Bob cannot know θ if
there is at least one single photon signal σl unknown to Bob. From the no-cloning theorem,
Bob cannot derive information on σl for pulses that contain only a single photon, and as
such it suffices for there to be at least one pulse with only a single photon. Provided that
this condition is satisfied, Alice can create a qubit where the phase is unknown to the server.
B. Remote blind qubit state preparation
RBSP proceeds according to the following procedure.
1. Preparation by Alice
(a) Prepare N WCPs with an average photon number of µ = T , where T denotes
channel transmittance. Each pulse has a phase randomly selected from the set
σl = 0,
pi
4
, 2pi
4
, ..., 7pi
4
(l = 1, ..., N). The state is described as follows:
ρσl = e−µ
∞∑
k=0
µk
k!
|k〉 〈k|σl (3)
(b) Send {ρσl}l to Bob.
2. Preparation by Bob
(a) Perform a quantum non-demolition measurement of the photon number on each
received state. Keep signals with a nonzero photon number, and discard the
others.
(b) Bob tells Alice the number of photons (n1, ..., nN) in each state.
3. Calculation and operation by Alice and Bob
(a) Alice makes sure that the number of reported vacuum states is not too large.
Specifically, if it is larger than N(e−T
2
+ T 2/6), the protocol is aborted.
(b) Bob transfers each state to a single qubit. Let the qubit number be M .
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(c) Use the above qubits to do I1DC. Obtain t = (t1, ..., tM) and state |+θ〉.
(d) Bob tells Alice t.
(e) Alice calculates θ using σl and t.
At this time, the probability pfail that information is leaked to Bob even though the
protocol was executed correctly, and the probability pabort that the protocol will be aborted
even if Bob is not cheating, satisfy the following expression:
pfail, pabort ≤ exp
(
−NT
4
18
)
, (4)
where T is the channel transmittance [3].
C. Remote blind state preparation with weak coherent pulses: decoy state method
In Ref. [3], it was demonstrated that the RBSP rate using WCP decreases in proportion
to the fourth power of channel transmittance. This is a major obstacle to attaining long-
distance RBSP. Therefore, a method for improving the RBSP has been introduced using the
decoy state method originally proposed in the field of QKD [7]. The procedure is as follows.
1. Preparation by Alice
(a) Prepare N WCPs including the signal state and two kinds of decoy states with
average photon numbers of µ, v1, v2, respectively. Each pulse has a phase ran-
domly defined by σl = 0,
pi
4
, 2pi
4
, ..., 7pi
4
(l = 1, ..., N). The signal state is described
as follows:
ρσlµ = e
−µ
∞∑
k=0
µk
k!
|k〉 〈k|σl (5)
Two decoy states ρσlv1 , ρ
σl
v2 are defined as well.
(b) Send the prepared states {ρσlµ }l, {ρσlv1}l, {ρσlv2}l to Bob.
2. Preparation by Bob
(a) Bob tells Alice which pulses he has received.
3. Calculation and manipulation by Alice and Bob
(a) Alice confirms that the yield of the signal and the two decoy states (Qµ, Qv1 , Qv2)
reported by Bob is not below a predetermined threshold. If it is, the protocol is
aborted.
(b) Alice tells Bob the position of the decoy and the computation size S.
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(c) Bob throws out the decoy states. The remaining qubits (the number is given by
Mµ) are divided randomly into S groups and Bob performs I1DC for each group.
Bob obtains |+θ〉 and sends the measurement result to Alice.
(d) Alice calculates θ in accordance with the procedure of I1DC.
In this decoy scheme, as in the original RBSP [3], the failure probability pfail is estimated
and a condition that it becomes less than ε is found [7, 8]. Here, S is the computation size,
which corresponds to the number of qubits ultimately created by Bob. Let the rate of the
single photon pulse by Bob left after the decoy pulses are discarded be p1. The number
of signal states for each group is given by m = Mµ/S, and the group fails unless there is
at least one single photon pulse in it. The probability that a group fails is given by the
following expression:
pfail =
(
m
Mµ −M1
)
(
m
Mµ
) ≤ (Mµ −M1
Mµ
)m
=
(
1− p1
)m
. (6)
Here, M1 is a single photon count number at Bob. If there is even one failed group among
S groups, RBSP fails. Therefore, the overall failure probability Pfail is given by
Pfail ≤ Spfail = S(1− p1)m. (7)
The condition that this is less than ε is given by
m ≥ ln (ε/S)
ln (1− p1) . (8)
In finite-length analysis, we ensure that Pfail is less than the given security parameter ε.
Below, we discuss the efficiency S/N and its asymptotic nature. For the asymptotic limit,
we fix the security rate ε/S instead of the security parameter ε because the overall failure
probability increases as the protocol repeats.
By using the relation (8), the lower limit of N is given by the following expression, under
the assumption that the ratio of the signal in N pulses is pµ:
N =
Mµ
pµQµ
=
mS
pµQµ
≥ S
pµQµ
ln (ε/S)
ln (1− p1) . (9)
Here, pµ, ε/S are the default values predetermined and followed by the necessary com-
putation and security level. Further, Qµ is a characteristic value of a photon source and
channel transmittance, while p1 needs to be estimated. From the expression of Y
L,v1,v2
1 in
[7], the minimum of p1 is given as follows:
p1 =
Q1
Qµ
≥ Y
L,v1,v2
1 µe
−µ
Qµ
=
µ2e−µ
µv1 − µv2 − v21 + v22
×[
Qv1
Qµ
ev1 − Qv2
Qµ
ev2 − v
2
1 − v22
µ2Qµ
(
Qµe
µ − Y L0
)]
. (10)
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It enables us to make µ almost independent to T whereas we have to make µ proportional to
T without decoy-state method. Here, Yi is a channel transmittance including the detection
efficiency for the signal of photon number i. In the case of a zero photon number Y0, it is
given by the dark count probability of detectors.
III. HERALDED SINGLE PHOTON SOURCE
In QKD, an alternative photon source has been proposed, called a heralded single pho-
ton source (HSPS), which utilizes spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) [9, 10].
SPDC is a nonlinear optical process that generates a two-photon pair (or pairs) called a
signal and idler. In this method, after the signal and idler are separated spatially by a
polarizing beam splitter or a dichroic mirror, the photon number for the idler is measured
using a practical photon number resolving detector [10], and signal pulses that include multi-
photons are removed from the key generation process. Since the number of photons can only
be measured stochastically, multiple photon pulses cannot be completely eliminated, yet the
probability that a nonzero signal pulse consists of a single photon can be increased. In
addition, by utilizing heralding with the idler detection, it is possible to reduce the detector
dark count, insofar as Bob accepts signal pulses only when the corresponding idler photon
is detected as a single photon. This enables longer distance communication. The photon
(pair) number distribution of SPDC is thermal when single mode approximation is valid:
P (n) =
µn
(1 + µ)n+1
. (11)
We assume that the photon number of the idler for generating heralding signals on Al-
ice’s side is measured by using a fiber beam splitter and single photon detectors, which do
not themselves have a photon number resolution [11–13]. The so-called time-multiplexed
detector works well if the detectors’ quantum efficiencies are good. In practice, currently
available superconducting single photon detectors typically offer detection efficiencies higher
than 0.85. Assuming that the number of couplers is x, the mode number X after the fiber
beamsplitter output ports is X = 2x. The probability of measuring m photon pulse as l
photon P (l|m) with the detection probability at each detector as ηA is given as follows [11]:
P (l|m) =
(
X
l
) l∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
l
j
)[
(1− ηA) + (l − j)ηA
X
]m
. (12)
After discarding multi-photon pulses and leaving only single photon pulses, the yield Qµ
and error rate Eµ are given by Eqs. (13) and (14), respectively. Here, we set the dark count
rate of the detectors on Alice’s side (heralding detector) as dA:
Qµ = Y0XdA
1
1 + µ
+
∞∑
i=1
YiP (1|i) µ
i
(1 + µ)i+1
, (13)
EµQµ = e0Y0XdA
1
1 + µ
+
∞∑
i=1
eiYiP (1|i) µ
i
(1 + µ)i+1
. (14)
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IV. REMOTE BLIND STATE PREPARATION WITH DECOY HSPS
We now turn to the case of HSPS. In this case, the mean photon number for the signal
and two decoy states is defined in the same manner as the WCP case (µ, v1, v2):
0 ≤ v2 < v1, (15)
v1 + v2 < µ. (16)
The yield for decoy states Qv1 , Qv2 is expressed as well. Then, the following can be
derived:
v1Qv2(1 + v2)
2 − v2Qv1(1 + v1)2
= [v1(1 + v2)− v2(1 + v1)]×
Y0XdA − v1v2
{[
v1
1 + v1
− v2
1 + v2
]
Y2P (1|2)
+
[
v21
(1 + v1)2
− v
2
2
(1 + v2)2
]
Y3P (1|3) + · · ·
}
≤ [v1(1 + v2)− v2(1 + v1)]Y0XdA (17)
and
Y0XdA ≥ Y L0 XdA
=max
{
v1Qv2(1 + v2)
2 − v2Qv1(1 + v1)2
v1(1 + v2)− v2(1 + v1) , 0
}
. (18)
The lower bound of Y0 is obtained as Y
L
0 . Here, a relation
v1
1+v1
> v2
1+v2
, from v1 > v2, is
utilized. Equation (18) holds for v2 = 0. Hence, the best lower bound is obtained in the
condition. Furthermore, Eq. (19) is derived from Eq. (17), and Eq. (20) is derived from
Eq. (16):
∞∑
i=2
YiP (1|i) µ
i
(1 + µ)i
= Qµ(1 + µ)− Y0XdA − Y1ηA µ
1 + µ
, (19)
(
v1
1+v1
)2 − ( v2
1+v2
)2
(
µ
1+µ
)2 ≥
(
v1
1+v1
)i − ( v2
1+v2
)i
(
µ
1+µ
)i . (20)
By removing Y0 from Qv1 and Qv2 , the minimum of Y1 is estimated (Y
L,v1,v2
1 ) in Eq. (21).
Y1ηA ≥ Y L,v1,v21 ηA
=
µ
1+µ
v1
1+v1
µ
1+µ
− v2
1+v2
µ
1+µ
− ( v1
1+v1
)2
+
(
v2
1+v2
)2×
[
Qv1(1 + v1)−Qv2(1 + v2)−
(
v1
1+v1
)2 − ( v2
1+v2
)2
(
µ
1+µ
)2
× {Qµ − Y L0 XdA}
]
(21)
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Inequalities (18) and (21) represent the minimum of Y0 and Y1, respectively. The expressions
of the lower limits allow us to estimate the lower limit of p1:
p1 =
Q1
Qµ
≥
Y L,v1,v21 ηA
µ
(1+µ)2
Qµ
, (22)
where Q1 is the yield for single photon pulses. The lower limit of N to attain “ε - blindness”
by using an HSPS is obtained by substituting Eq. (22) with Eq. (9).
V. RESULT
Thus far, we have considered an asymptotic case where the size S has an infinite length.
However, when considering the generation of a finite-length graph state in practice, it is
necessary to evaluate the deviation from the Poissonian, which should be attained in an
infinite-length graph state. Here, it is necessary to evaluate the blind state generation
efficiency, defined as S/N . Its maximization is considered a performance index of RBSP.
For WCP blind quantum computations without decoy states [3], for Bob detection number
Mµ = O(NµT ), all signals that consist of more than two photons are assumed to be detected
by Bob M≥2 = O(Nµ2). Then, M≥2/Mµ = O(µ/T ). Therefore, if µ ≤ O(T ) is not satisfied,
M≥2/Mµ ≥ 1. Even if m is increased, an inequality (M≥2Mµ )m < pfail cannot be satisfied. As
µ increases, Mµ becomes larger, so µ = O(T ). As for pabort, the difference N∆ between the
number M0 of states for which the server measured 0 and its expectation value is bounded
O(
√
N) because it obeys Eq. (9) of the supplimentary material of [3], which is Hoeffding’s
bound, and they consider pabort as a small constant. The signal detection number Mµ needs
to be much higher than M0, O(NµT ) > O(
√
N). Then, N > O((µT )−2) is necessary.
Finally, the efficiency is S/N = O(T 4).
Indeed, the bound of the statistical fluctuation N∆ in [3] is loose. Hoeffding’s bound
for independent random variables can be replaced with the Chernoff bound. It bounds the
difference between the actual and expected values of Mµ to be O(
√
NµT ). It makes this
difference irrelevant to the efficiency of the protocol in the asymptotic regime. In this study,
the total detection number Mµ is the same, whereas M≥2 = O(Nµ2T ), because the value
is precisely estimated by decoy states. Therefore, M≥2/Mµ = O(µ), such that the qubit
number m for obtaining a single qubit does need not increase as the distance increases
(m = O(1), µ = O(1)). As a result, the efficiency will be S/N = Mµ/(Nm) = O(T ). For
the finite-length RBSP, we can still take advantage of utilizing decoy states.
In the following, we will evaluate the efficiency S/N and the performance of HSPS.
Parameters Qµ, Qv1 , Qv2 needed to calculate S/N are obtained using the transmittance T ,
derived by Eq. (26), where α(dB/km) is the loss factor in an optical fiber, L is the fiber
length (km), ts is the transmittance inside the server, and ηs, is the detection rate on the
server side. Here, µ is the average photon number, and in the case of WCP and HSPS, we
use Eqs. (27) and (28), respectively. We also set the average photon numbers v1 and v2 for
decoy states.
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Qµ ≃ Y0 + Tµ, (23)
Qv1 ≃ Y0 + Tv1, (24)
Qv2 ≃ Y0 + Tv2, (25)
T = 10−αL/10tsηs, (26)
µwcp = µ (27)
µthermal =
∞∑
i=0
µi
(1 + µ)i+1
P (1|i). (28)
Here, α = 0.2 dB/km, L = 25 km, ts = 0.45, ηs = 0.1, and the server’s dark count Y0 is set to
6×10−6 [8]. Furthermore, v2 is the optimum value 0, and v1 = 0.125. We also set the signal
proportion pµ to 0.9. These values are adjusted to the values used in [8] for comparison.
Furthermore, the detection efficiency ηA of the heralding detector on Alice included only
in HSPS is set to 0.85, and the dark count rate dA is set to 1.0 × 10−8. This is a value
sufficiently achievable with a commercially available superconducting single photon detector
[14].
In Fig. 1, the dependence of S/N on µ is shown. In WCP (HSPS), the maximum is
obtained with µ = 0.625, p1 = 0.51 (µ = 0.605, p1 = 0.65). Moreover, S/N for WCP
is about 3/2 times higher. The reason S/N is inferior in HSPS is because the efficiency
of the heralding detector is imperfect and because the multi-photon probability for HSPS
(thermal) is higher than the Poisson distribution. When the efficiency of the heralding
detector approaches unity, it approaches the WCP.
WCP
HSPS
 2.0×10
-4
 1.5×10
-4
 1.0×10
-4
 0.5×10
-4
0
0.2 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.8
S
/N
μ
FIG. 1. Dependence of S/N on µ. (ηA = 0.85, dA = 1.0× 10−8)
We also calculated a case using the lowest dark count rate demonstrated so far [19]. Here,
according to [19], the dark count rate per second is 0.01 cps, and dA is 1.0×10−12 within the
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detection window width of 100 ps. The detection efficiency ηA is 0.04. The S/N dependence
on µ is shown in Fig. 2. In this case, the upper limit of S/N was considerably low due to
the influence of Alice’s low detection efficiency ηA. It was about two orders of magnitude
lower than in the case of WCP. From this result, we found that decreasing the photon
detection efficiency by one order was more influential than improving the dark count rate by
four orders of magnitude. Therefore, in the following calculation, we used the parameters
ηA = 0.85 and dA = 1.0× 10−8.
WCP
HSPS
S
/N
μ
0.2 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.8
 1.0×10-7
 1.0×10-6
 1.0×10-5
 1.0×10-4
 1.0×10-3
FIG. 2. S/N dependence on µ. (ηA = 0.04, dA = 1.0 × 10−12)
Next, S/N dependence on the distance L is shown in Fig. 3. For each distance L, we
numerically obtained the maximum S/N by varying µ. Up to 100 km, µ was constant at
0.625 for WCP and 0.605 for HSPS.
WCP
HSPS
 4.0×10
-4
 3.0×10
-4
 2.0×10
-4
 1.0×10
-4
0
S
/N
L(km)
 5.0×10
-4
 6.0×10
-4
0 20 40 60 80 100
FIG. 3. S/N dependence on distance. (ηA = 0.85, dA = 1.0 × 10−8)
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Furthermore, Fig. 4 shows the S/N up to L = 1000 km. In the long-distance regime, the
S/N becomes constant. The signal from Alice rarely reaches Bob, owing to the decrease in
transmittance T . The yields in Qµ, Qv1 , Qv2 are all derived from dark counts and become
constant regardless of the distance. So the flat area is removed from the plot to avoid
confusion. Therefore, the distance that starts to become flat in Fig. 4 indicates the upper
limit of the distance for RBSP. This was approximately 200 km by WCP and 500 km by
HSPS. By reducing the probability of zero photon pulses with the use of the heralding
detector, RBSP with HSPS extended the distance farther than with WCP.
WCP
HSPS
S
/N
L(km)
      10
-2
0 200 400 600 800 1000
      10
-4
      10
-6
      10
-8
      10
-10
      10
-12
      10
-14
FIG. 4. S/N dependence on distance up to a 1000 km. (ηA = 0.85, dA = 1.0 × 10−8)
As discussed above, the S/N for HSPS is lower than in the case of WCP. This is because
of the difference in the photon number distributions. Specifically, this is due to a lower
single photon probability in SPDC compared to the Poisson distribution of WCP. When
using HSPS with a broad spectral width, which corresponds to a case where the Poisson
distribution is obtained [18], there is considerable dispersion in the optical fiber and this
cannot be ignored. Consequently, it is unrealistic to consider this case.
Moreover, in order to consider the upper limit from using HSPS, calculations were also
made when ηA = 1.0 and dA = 1.0× 10−8. The value of S/N with varying fiber length L is
given in Fig. 5. For the purpose of comparison, the case of WCP is also shown.
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WCP
HSPS
 4.0×10
-4
 3.0×10
-4
 2.0×10
-4
 1.0×10
-4
S
/N
L(km)
 5.0×10
-4
 6.0×10
-4
0 20 40 60 80 100
FIG. 5. S/N dependence on distance (ηA = 1.0, dA = 1.0 × 10−8).
WCP
HSPS d=10
S
/N
L(km)
      10
-2
0 200 400 600 800 1000
      10
-4
      10
-6
      10
-8
      10
-10
      10
-12
      10
-14
      10
-16
      10
-18
-8
HSPS d=10-12
FIG. 6. S/N dependence on distance (Purple solid: WCP, green dashed: HSPS with ηA = 1.0, dA =
1.0× 10−8, blue dotted: HSPS with ηA = 1.0, dA = 1.0 × 10−12).
It can be seen from this figure that HSPS exceeds WCP when the heralding detector’s
efficiency is at unity though the improvement is small (roughly around 8 %). Note that since
we are utilizing a time-multiplexed detector to obtain the photon number resolution, there
is still a probability of failure, in which a multi-photon is counted as a single photon.This is
possible when a multi-photon exists and stays in the same mode after the final fiber coupler.
To see the longest distance available by the state of the art technology, we assume the dark
count rate of 10−12 with unit detection efficienty in Fig. 6. While S/N improvement is
mild, the longest distance is close to 700 km which is more than three times of the distance
achievable with WCP. Clearly, the improvement is due to the small dark count probability
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which enables the lower signal transmittance.
VI. DISCUSSION
The performance of the I1DC protocol with HSPS is worse than that with WCP from the
viewpoint of S/N unless the efficiency of the heralding detector approaches 1. Now we focus
on m as another performance index. The I1DC protocol creates a qubit using m pulses,
such that a smaller m helps to reduce the tasks on the server. It is clear that m depends on
p1 from Eq. (8). In the protocol using WCP, the single photon probability p1 is expressed
as follows:
p1 =
Q1
Qµ
≥ Y
L,v1,v2
1 µe
−µ
Qµ
, (29)
where Y L,v1,v21 is the lower limit of single-photon transmittance, and µe
−µ is the probability
of a single photon pulse by Poisson distribution. Since these values are fixed, it is impossible
to raise the single photon probability further.
On the other hand, the single photon probability p1 of HSPS includes the heralding
detection probability ηA. This is a value that can be increased with the development of
single photon detectors and other optical equipment. In addition, heralding maintains the
value of Q1 while decreasing Qµ. Therefore, when HSPS is used, it is possible to reduce N
and increase p1—that is, reducing m. When a heralding detection efficiency ηA is 0.85, the
dark count rate dA is 1.0 × 10−8, and the fiber length is L = 25 km, p1 with HSPS is 0.65,
exceeding that of WCP (0.51). In the case of ηA = 1.0, p1 is 0.81. Therefore, the use of
HSPS instead of WCP reduces the number of operations performed on the server.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we investigated RBSP in blind quantum computation by using a heralded
single photon source and decoy states. With the decoy-state method and the improved
estimation, we show that the scaling of the required number N of pulses becomes O(1/T ).
By lowering the multiphoton probability using HSPS and available photon number resolving
detectors, the communication distance was extended to 500 km, which is more than twice
that of WCP. We also showed that when the efficiency of the heralding detector approaches
1, RBSP-HSPS outperforms RBSP-WCP in terms of the efficiency S/N or the required
number of pulses. Thus, the distance of secure cloud quantum computations can be greatly
extended, facilitating the potential of future quantum computers.
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